bpf: Add _kernel suffix to internal lockdown_bpf_read
Rename LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ into LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL so we have naming
more consistent with a LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER option that we are adding.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 24eda04..724d7a4 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
LOCKDOWN_KCORE,
LOCKDOWN_KPROBES,
- LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ,
+ LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL,
LOCKDOWN_PERF,
LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS,
LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW,
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
index 62cf0038..0b04553 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
@@ -1070,12 +1070,12 @@ bpf_base_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user:
return &bpf_probe_read_user_proto;
case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel:
- return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ) < 0 ?
+ return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL) < 0 ?
NULL : &bpf_probe_read_kernel_proto;
case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str:
return &bpf_probe_read_user_str_proto;
case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str:
- return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ) < 0 ?
+ return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL) < 0 ?
NULL : &bpf_probe_read_kernel_str_proto;
case BPF_FUNC_snprintf_btf:
return &bpf_snprintf_btf_proto;
diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
index b4916ef..1836591 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -999,19 +999,19 @@ bpf_tracing_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog)
case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user:
return &bpf_probe_read_user_proto;
case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel:
- return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ) < 0 ?
+ return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL) < 0 ?
NULL : &bpf_probe_read_kernel_proto;
case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str:
return &bpf_probe_read_user_str_proto;
case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str:
- return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ) < 0 ?
+ return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL) < 0 ?
NULL : &bpf_probe_read_kernel_str_proto;
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE
case BPF_FUNC_probe_read:
- return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ) < 0 ?
+ return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL) < 0 ?
NULL : &bpf_probe_read_compat_proto;
case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str:
- return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ) < 0 ?
+ return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL) < 0 ?
NULL : &bpf_probe_read_compat_str_proto;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 09533cb..6b83ab4 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
[LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
[LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
- [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
+ [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
[LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf",
[LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs",
[LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access",